Wednesday, December 1, 2021

Songs for the Christmas Season

Here's my annual (and updated) list of songs related to the Christmas season. Some are traditional, some are modern, some are secular, and some are somewhat humorous. Like last year, I've sorted them into categories, although there are some that could easily be sorted into more than one. When possible, I've linked them to iTunes Preview, YouTube, etc., so you can listen to (preview) or watch them. (Note: Please let me know if some of the links don't "link," i.e., they need to be updated; Apple Music updated several of its links).

Classics
  1. Auld Lang Syne - Colbie Caillat
  2. Blue Christmas - Elvis Presley
  3. Christmas Canon - Trans-Siberian Orchestra
  4. The Christmas Song - Nat King Cole
  5. Frosty the Snowman - Jimmy Durante
  6. Have Yourself a Merry Little Christmas - Vonda Shepard
  7. Holly Jolly Christmas - Burl Ives
  8. I'll Be Home for Christmas - Michael Bublé
  9. In the Bleak Midwinter - Phil Coulter
  10. I Wonder As I Wander - Sandi Patti
  11. It's the Most Wonderful Time of the Year - Andy Williams
  12. I've Got My Love to Keep Me Warm - Frank Sinatra
  13. Jingle Bells - Michael Bublé
  14. Let it Snow - Dean Martin
  15. Little Drummer Boy - Bob Seger
  16. Mistletoe and Holly - Frank Sinatra
  17. Peace on Earth/Little Drummer Boy - Bing Crosby and David Bowie
  18. Rudolph, the Red-Nosed Reindeer - Burl Ives
  19. Santa Bring My Baby Back (to Me) - Elvis
  20. Silver Bells - Andy Williams
  21. Snow - Bing Crosby, Danny Kay, Rosemary Clooney, and Vera-Allen (dubbed by Trudy Stevens)
  22. There's No Place Like Home for the Holidays - Perry Como
  23. What are You Doing New Year's Eve? - Ella Fitzgerald
  24. White Christmas - Bing Crosby
  25. You're a Mean One, Mr. Grinch - Thurl Ravenscroft
  26. 'Zat You, Santa Clause? - Louis Armstrong and the Commanders
Contemporary
  1. All I Want for Christmas Is You - Mariah Carey
  2. Believe - Josh Groban
  3. Carols Sing - Michael W. Smith
  4. Celebrate Me Home - Kenny Loggins
  5. Christmas (Baby Please Come Home) - U2
  6. Christmas Can't Be Very Far Away - Amy Grant
  7. Christmas in Dixie - Alabama
  8. Christmas in Your Arms - Alabama
  9. Christmas is Coming - Vince Guaraldi Trio
  10. Christmas Island - Jimmy Buffett
  11. The Christmas Shoes - NewSong
  12. Christmas Time is Here - Vince Guaraldi Trio
  13. Christmas Waltz - Michael W. Smith
  14. Cold December Night - Michael Bublé
  15. Do They Know It's Christmas - Glee Cast
  16. Extraordinary Merry Christmas - Glee Cast
  17. Feliz Navidad - José Feliciano
  18. Going Home For Christmas - Phil Coulter
  19. Grown Up Christmas List - Amy Grant
  20. The Happiest Christmas - Michael W. Smith
  21. Happy Xmas (The War is Over) - John Lennon
  22. Hey Santa - Carnie and Wendy Wilson
  23. High Plains (Christmas on the High-Line) - Philip Aaberg
  24. This Holiday Night - Margo Rey
  25. It Snowed - Meaghan Smith
  26. Jingle Bell Rock - Bobby Helms
  27. Last Christmas - Glee Cast
  28. Linus and Lucy - Vince Guaraldi Trio
  29. Merry Christmas Baby - Bruce Springsteen
  30. Merry Christmas Darling - The Carpenters
  31. Mister Santa - Amy Grant
  32. Nothin' New for New Years - Harry Connick, Jr. & George Jones
  33. Please Come Home For Christmas - The Eagles
  34. River - Joni Mitchell
  35. Santa Claus in Coming to Town - Bruce Springsteen
  36. Santa Baby - Madonna
  37. Santa Tell Me - Ariana Grande
  38. Skating - Vince Guaraldi Trio
  39. Sleigh Ride - The Carpenters
  40. Snoopy's Christmas - The Royal Guardsmen
  41. Song For A Winter's Night - Sarah McLachlan
  42. Tennessee Christmas - Amy Grant
  43. This Christmas - Vonda Shepard
  44. To Be Together - Amy Grant
  45. Where Are You Christmas? - Faith Hill
Traditional Hymns and Carols
  1. Angels We Have Heard on High - Glee Cast
  2. Ave Maria - The Carpenters
  3. Away in a Manger/Child in a Manger - Michael W. Smith
  4. Carol of the Bells - The Carpenters
  5. Deck the Halls - James Taylor
  6. Do You Hear What I Hear? - Whitney Houston
  7. Emmanuel, God With Us - Amy Grant
  8. The First Noel - Josh Groban & Faith Hill
  9. Go Tell It On The Mountain - James Taylor
  10. God Rest Ye Merry, Gentlemen - Glee Cast
  11. Greensleeves - Vince Guaraldi Trio
  12. Hark the Herald Angels Sing - Diamond Rio
  13. The Holly and the Ivy - Choir of King's College, Cambridge
  14. It Came Upon a Midnight Clear - Johnny Cash
  15. I Heard the Bells on Christmas Day - Casting Crowns
  16. I Saw Three Ships - Craig Duncan
  17. Jesu, Joy Of Man's Desiring - Amy Grant
  18. Joy to the World - Hillsong
  19. The Nutcracker Suite - Various
  20. O Come All Ye Faithful - Pentatonix
  21. O Come, O Come Emmanuel - The Piano Guys
  22. O Holy Night - Josh Groban
  23. O Little Town of Bethlehem - Nat King Cole
  24. Pat-a-Pan - Various
  25. Silent Night - Sarah McLachlan
Contemporary Gospel
  1. Almost There - Michael W. Smith and Amy Grant
  2. Breath of Christmas - Amy Grant
  3. Christmas Hymn - Amy Grant
  4. Christmas Was Meant for Children - Sandi Patti
  5. Christmastime - Michael W. Smith
  6. Christ is Born - The Carpenters
  7. God is With Us - Casting Crowns
  8. Little Alter Boy - The Carpenters
  9. Newborn - MercyMe
  10. Sweet Little Jesus Boy - Casting Crowns
Humorous
  1. Baby, Just Go Outside - The Holderness Family
  2. The Chanukah Song - Adam Sandler
  3. Grandma Got Run Over by a Reindeer - Elmo & Patsy
  4. I Saw Mommy Kissing Santa Claus - John Mellencamp
  5. Walkin' Round in Women's Underwear - Bob Rivers and Twisted Radio

 

Monday, November 22, 2021

Reinhold Niebuhr, Religious Nationalism, and the Appeal of Authoritarianism (Why Do So Many Christians Support Trump?, Part VII)

When in 1948 Time magazine looked for someone to put on the cover of their 25th Anniversary issue, they could have chosen a Hollywood celebrity, notable politician, or perhaps a decorated WWII veteran. Instead, they chose an ethics professor at Union Theological Seminary in New York: Reinhold Niebuhr. Today, many Americans have not heard of Niebuhr although most are familiar with a prayer he wrote in the 1930s (but for which until recently he seldom received credit):

God, give us grace to accept with serenity the things that cannot be changed,
Courage to change the things that should be changed,
And wisdom to distinguish the one from the other.

Niebuhr did much more, however. He was an activist-scholar who influenced not only his parishioners and students, but others as well, such as the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., who drew extensively on his insights on power when crafting strategies during the Civil Rights movement. The State Department also sought Niebuhr's advice on different aspects of U.S. foreign policy, which is ironic since at the same time the FBI had placed Niebuhr on its watch list, suspecting him of un-American activities.

Niebuhr continues to influence people today. Some of his books are still used as texts in political science classes, and former President Barack Obama counts him as one of his favorite philosophers. Obama once remarked that Niebuhr taught him "the compelling idea that there’s serious evil in the world, and hardship and pain. And we should be humble and modest in our belief we can eliminate those things. But we shouldn’t use that as an excuse for cynicism and inaction. I take away... the sense we have to make these efforts knowing they are hard, and not swinging from naïve idealism to bitter realism.” President Jimmy Carter has expressed similar sentiments, and the philosopher/theologian Cornel West considers Niebuhr to be a "soul mate."

Reinhold Niebuhr and Religious Nationalism

Two interrelated threads seem to lie at the heart of Niebuhr’s thought: One, was his belief that many of us have an overly optimistic view of human nature. Although there is goodness to be found in the human heart, there is also pride and self-deceit. The quest for and access to power and status are ongoing temptations to which we often succumb. Like the biblical story of the Tower of Babel (Niebuhr 1937), we are tempted to become god-like, not recognizing our own finitude and limitations. Unlike many liberal theologians of his day, Niebuhr embraced the language of “original sin” and argued that a minimal amount of coercion, although seemingly incompatible with Jesus’s vision of the kingdom of God, was an unfortunate necessity (Niebuhr [1929] 1957:193). He also challenged the utopian visions of some secular philosophers, such as John Dewey, who believed that education, coupled with reason, was all we need to make the world more just:
Though educators ever since the eighteenth century have given themselves to the fond illusion that justice through voluntary co-operation waited only upon a more universal or a more adequate educational enterprise, there is good reason to believe that the sentiments of benevolence and social goodwill will never be so pure or powerful, and the rational capacity to consider the rights and needs of others in fair competition with our own will never be so fully developed as to create the anarchist millennium which is the social utopia, either explicit or implicit, of all intellectual or religious moralists. (Niebuhr [1932] 1960:3)
A second thread was his extension of the first beyond private morality. Niebuhr argued that although privately, people can, and often do, live morally upright lives, they will often embrace, tolerate, or identify with immoral policies and institutions that harm thousands (e.g., laws that sanction racial segregation, economic policies that heighten inequalities, movements that promote one group over another). Collective pride and self-interest kick in, limiting the impact of reason. Niebuhr believed that because reason was “always, to some degree, the servant of [self-]interest” (Niebuhr [1932] 1960:xiv-xv), collective morality was difficult to attain:
The development of social justice does depend to some degree upon the extension of rationality. But the limits of reason make it inevitable that pure moral action, particularly in the intricate, complex and collective relationships, should be an impossible goal. Men will never be wholly reasonable, and the proportion of reason to impulse becomes increasingly negative when we proceed from the life of individuals to that of social groups, among whom a common mind and purpose is always more or less inchoate and transitory, and who depend therefore upon a common impulse to bind them together. (Niebuhr [1932] 1960:34-35)
Although Niebuhr believed that “at times the proverbial voice of reason can prevent a group from behaving rashly, people can also use the power of intellect to manipulate, cajole, and coerce others. The human will, in other words, can weaponize reason to do harm as well as good, and human relations attest to the fact that self-interest consistently prevails over generosity” (Sabella 2017). If he were alive today, Niebuhr would probably consider intellectuals such as Steven Pinker (2019) as being overly-optimistic about reason's ability to overcome the power of self-interest.

Niebuhr concluded that getting one’s hand dirty in the political process was necessary. “Moral man,” he believed, “had to be willing to engage immoral society on society’s own terms” (Sabella 2017:26). Moreover, although he saw the value of social movements and often worked with them, he believed that in order to bring about genuine social change, one needed “to enlist the power of government” (Ronald H. Stone, quoted in Sabella 2017:45).

Niebuhr’s cynicism was tempered by his faith. He believed Jesus’s life and teachings pull us toward an ideal which although we will never realize in our lifetimes, can lead to us to act in ways that can make the world a better place:
For Niebuhr, the kingdom of God is the state of perfect harmony among human beings. As such, it is an ‘impossible possibility’: although we will never succeed in building the kingdom in this life, we must strive for it nonetheless because we know it is real. And in our striving, we manage to catch glimpses of the kingdom in human life... A vision of the kingdom is key, if not achieving, then at least to ‘approximating the kingdom of God on earth,’ as Andrew Finstuen puts it." (Sabella 2017:126)
Niebuhr held that we are inherently tribal beings, and our tribal tendencies can manifest themselves in religious nationalism, which he saw as highly dangerous. “What makes [religious nationalisms] so dangerous is that they conjoin so many different forms of collective pride—not only spiritual and national pride, but race and class pride as well—and then arm them with the power of the modern state" (Gorski 2017:125).

Niebuhr believed that every nation has its own form of collective pride, and he traced America’s back to the Puritans and Jeffersonians: in particular, the belief that America is God’s “American Israel” (Niebuhr [1952] 2008:24) and that with the founding of the United States, we had turned our “back upon the vices of Europe” (Niebuhr [1952] 2008:28) to “make a new beginning in a corrupt world” (Niebuhr [1952] 2008:25). Moreover, although we initially saw our nation's increasing prosperity as evidence of God’s grace, over time we came to see it as proof of our moral superiority and virtue (Niebuhr [1952] 2008:51). That's why, he argued, we tend to respond poorly to criticism “since we [believe] that our society is so essentially virtuous that only malice could prompt criticism of our actions” (Niebuhr [1952] 2008:25).

In many ways, Niebuhr anticipated how social identity theorists have highlighted our tribal tendencies, in particular, our tendency to see the groups to which we belong as better than others. Not only do we tend to favor members of our own groups, we often pull for them to “win” even if winning leaves us worse off than compromising. A corollary to this is that when members of our groups' are attacked, either verbally or physically, we also feel “attacked.” This often leads groups to close ranks and increase the "distance" between ourselves and others. In practical terms this suggests that if we are truly interested in decreasing the polarization in our society, attacking our opponents (e.g., making fun of them, characterizing them as morally or intellectually inferior than us) isn't the answer.

Nationalism and the Appeal of Authoritarianism

So, what has contributed to the current wave of Christian nationalism? Anne Applebaum's persuasively argues that the rise of authoritarianism in the West lies, at least in part, in the sense among some that a cherished way of life, a sense of national identity, is slipping away. And individuals such as Victor Orbán in Hungary, Boris Johnson in Britain, and Donald Trump in the United States promise to halt this slide. For (some) Americans this means that "any price should be paid, any crime should be forgiven, any outrage should be ignored if that's what it takes to get real America, the old America, back" (Applebaum, p. 171). Applebaum notes how for some conservatives, the Reaganite optimism has given way to something akin to apocalyptic despair, and she holds up Laura Ingraham as an example ("Laura Ingraham’s Descent Into Despair").

David Brooks observations from the recent "National Conservatism Conference" ("The Terrifying Future of the American Right") seem to bear this out:

"Conservatives have always inveighed against the cultural elite—the media, the universities, Hollywood. But in the Information Age, the purveyors of culture are now corporate titans... The national conservatives thus describe a world in which the corporate elite, the media elite, the political elite, and the academic elite have all coagulated into one axis of evil, dominating every institution and controlling the channels of thought... "At the heart of this blue oligarchy are the great masters of surveillance capitalism, the Big Tech czars who decide in secret what ideas get promoted, what stories get suppressed... The idea that the left controls absolutely everything—from your smartphone to the money supply to your third grader’s curriculum—explains the apocalyptic tone that was the dominating emotional register of this conference:
'The left’s ambition is to create a world beyond belonging. Their grand ambition is to deconstruct the United States of America.' (Josh Hawley) 
'The left’s attack is on America. The left hates America. It is the left that is trying to use culture as a tool to destroy America.' (Ted Cruz) 
'We are confronted now by a systematic effort to dismantle our society, our traditions, our economy, and our way of life.' (Marco Rubio)
"My old friend Rod Dreher [an Eastern Orthodox Christian] of The American Conservative argued that because the left controls the commanding heights of the culture and the economy, the only institution the right has a shot at influencing is the state. In these circumstances the right has to use state power to promote its values. 'We need to quit being satisfied with owning the libs, and save our country,' Dreher said. 'We need to unapologetically embrace the use of state power.'

"This is where Viktor Orbán comes in. It was Dreher who prompted [Tucker] Carlson’s controversial trip to Hungary last summer, and Hungarians were a strong presence at the National Conservatism Conference. Orbán, in Dreher’s view, understands the civilizational stakes of the culture war; he has, for instance, used the power of the state to limit how much transgenderism can be taught to children in schools. 'Our team talks incessantly about how horrible wokeness is,' Dreher said at the conference. 'Orbán actually does something about it.'"

If Applebaum and Brooks are right, it makes no difference to folks like Dreher, Hawley, Cruz, Rubio, and others that Donald Trump is morally challenged. That's because he's willing to do what ever is necessary to get the "real America" back, or at least their idea of the "real America." Thus, appeals to reason and rationality, right and wrong, or simply common sense are not going to change their minds any time soon (if ever).

Previous Posts
  1. Introduction (Why Do So Many Christians Support Trump?, Part I)
  2. Who are the 81%? (Why Do So Many Christians Support Trump?, Part II)
  3. The Rural-Urban Divide (Why Do So Many Christians Support Trump?, Part III)
  4. The Economic Divide (Why Do So Many Christians Support Trump?, Part IV)
  5. Ideas Matter (Why Do So Many Christians Support Trump?, Part V)
  6. The Appeal of Christian Nationalism (Why Do So Many Christians Support Trump?, Part VI)
References

Applebaum, Anne. 2020. Twilight of Democracy: The Seductive Lure of Authoritarianism. New York, NY: Anchor Books.

Niebuhr, Reinhold. 1937. "The Tower of Babel." Pp. 25-46 in Beyond Tragedy. New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons.

____. [1929] 1957. Leaves From the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic. New York, NY: Living Age Books.

____. [1932] 1960. Moral Man and Immoral Society. New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons.

____. [1952] 2008. The Irony of American History. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Pinker, Steven. 2019. Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress. New York: Penguin Books.

Sabella, Jeremy L. 2017. An American Conscience: The Reinhold Niebuhr Story. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.

Sunday, November 7, 2021

The Appeal of Christian Nationalism (Why Do So Many Christians Support Trump?, Part VI)

In previous posts, I have explored possible explanations as to why such a large portion of conservative Christians supported Trump in the 2016 and 2020 elections. To recap (since it's been awhile):
  1. Introduction (Why Do So Many Christians Support Trump?, Part I)
  2. Who are the 81%? (Why Do So Many Christians Support Trump?, Part II)
  3. The Rural-Urban Divide (Why Do So Many Christians Support Trump?, Part III)
  4. The Economic Divide (Why Do So Many Christians Support Trump?, Part IV)
  5. Ideas Matter (Why Do So Many Christians Support Trump?, Part V)
In this post I explore the positive association between Christian nationalism and support for Trump. No one has probably explored this relationship more than Andrew Whitehead, Samuel Perry, and Joseph Baker (2018). They have shown that holding beliefs associated with Christian nationalism is a strong predictor of whether someone voted for Trump. Consider, for example, the following graph, which plots the predicted probability of someone voting for Trump in 2016 (Y-axis) by the degree they embrace Christian nationalistic views (Christian Nationalism Index, X-axis), broken down by whether someone identifies as a Republican, Independent, or Democrat (Whitehead et al., p. 162).


It shows that as the higher one rates in terms of Christian nationalism, the more likely they were to vote for Trump. Moreover, it shows that this was true across party affiliation although (unsurprisingly) Republicans were more likely to vote for Trump than Democrats with Independents falling in between. None of this is to suggest that of all Trump’s supporters are white nationalists, of course. It is merely to note that those who hold white nationalist views are more likely to vote for Trump than those who do not.

To construct the Christian Nationalism Index they combined six measures from separate questions that ask for agreement with whether
  • “The federal government should declare the United States a Christian nation”
  • “The federal government should advocate Christian values”
  • “The federal government should enforce strict separation of church and state” (reverse coded)
  • “The federal government should allow the display of religious symbols in public spaces”
  • “The success of the United States is part of God’s plan”
  • “The federal government should allow prayer in public schools”
Possible response options for each question range on a five-point scale from (1) “strongly disagree” to (5) “strongly agree” with (3) “Undecided” as the middle category. Scores ranged from 6 to 30 (0 to 24 when rescaled) and meet standard statistical thresholds for combining multiple questions into a single scale.

In a book-length study, Whitehead and Perry (2020) sorted Americans into four categories or perspectives concerning Christian Nationalism: Ambassadors, Accommodators, Resisters, and Rejecters. Ambassadors are "wholly supportive of Christian nationalism" (p. 35), Accommodators tend to believe "that the federal government should advocate for Christian values, [they are] undecided about the federal government officially declaring the United States is a Christian nation" (p. 33); Resisters "lean toward opposing Christian nationalism" but "may be undecided about allowing the display of religious symbols in public places" (p.31); finally, Rejectors "generally believe there should be no connection between Christianity and politics" (p. 26). Ambassadors score from 24-30 on the scale and account for 19.8% of Americans; Accommodators score from 18-23 and account for 32.1% of Americans; Resisters score from 12-17 and account for 26.6% of Americans, and Rejecters score from 6-11 and account for 21.5% of Americans.

What interests us here is whether conservative Protestants are more likely to embrace Christian nationalist views. The answer is yes, but but not by as great of margin as one might suspect. The graph below (from the Baylor 2017 Survey, same one used by Whitehead et al.) plots the average Christian Nationalism score by religious tradition. Unsurprisingly, conservative Protestants, on average, score higher on the index than other religious traditions, but other traditions (e.g., Black Protestant, Roman Catholic) are not too far behind.


Although nationalism and authoritarianism do not always go hand-in-hand, they are often found together (Tudor and Slater 2020), as they are now in parts of Europe and the United States. So, why is that in the U.S. it is conservative Christians who are more likely to embrace Christian nationalism and support someone with authoritarian tendencies like Donald Trump? We can no longer assume that individuals attracted to authoritarianism (commonly referred to as the "authoritarian personality") are only found among conservatives, although that has been the working assumption among social scientists for decades. However, recent research, such as that by the psychologist and behavioral economist Karen Stenner, have found authoritarian attitudes among both conservatives and liberals (see also, "The Experts Somehow Overlooked Authoritarians on the Left"). Stenner prefers the term, "authoritarian predisposition," because predispositions do not always manifest themselves. They can lay dormant and are only triggered in certain situations.

It is likely that some of the factors I've considered in previous posts helped act as triggers among conservative Christians. Moreover, according to Kristin Kobes Du Mez (2020, pp. 4, 6-7) white evangelicals have long been primed to support someone who embodied a “rugged, aggressive, militant masculinity” and embraced “patriarchal authority, gender difference, and Christian nationalism.” Thus, Trump's mix of authoritarianism and Christian nationalism fit an image long embraced by evangelicals and help explain why he's become their "new high priest" in spite of his moral shortcomings (Du Mez, Chapter 15).

The question remains as to the appeal of the Christian nationalism embodied by Donald Trump. I'll take this up in my next post when I consider Reinhold Niebuhr's reflections on religious nationalism, as well as Anne Applebaum's recent exploration of the rise of authoritarianism in the West (and not just the United States). Part of the answer lies in the sense among some that a cherished way of life, a sense of national identity, is slipping away. For some Americans this means that "any price should be paid, any crime should be forgiven, any outrage should be ignored if that's what it takes to get real America, the old America, back" (Applebaum, p. 171). And they see Trump as the only one who can restore America to its former greatness, and that is reason enough to vote for him.

References

Applebaum, Anne. 2020. Twilight of Democracy: The Seductive Lure of Authoritarianism. New York, NY: Anchor Books.

Du Mez, Kristin Kobes. 2020. Jesus and John Wayne: How White Evangelicals Corrupted a Faith and Fractured a Nation. New York, NY: Liveright Publishing Corporation.

Stenner, Karen. 2005. The Authoritarian Dynamic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tudor, Maya, and Dan Slater. 2021. "Nationalism, Authoritarianism, and Democracy: Historical Lessons from South and Southeast Asia." Perspectives on Politics 19(3):706-22. doi: 10.1017/S153759272000078X

Whitehead, Andrew L, Samuel L Perry, and Joseph O Baker. 2018. "Make America Christian Again: Christian Nationalism and Voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election." Sociology of Religion 79(2):147-71. doi: 10.1093/socrel/srx070

Sunday, October 24, 2021

The Giants and Giants fans would like to thank...

The Giants and Giants fans would like to thank...

...the Philadelphia Phillies and their fans for blaming Gabe Kapler for their woes. The Phillies win % under Kapler was .497; under his successor, Joe Girardi? .497. You might have noticed that the Giants won 107 games this season.

...the so-called experts who prematurely declared the Padres and Dodgers to be the new rivalry in the West. Rivalry? To quote Inigo Montoya, "I don't think that word means what you think it means." Did you happen to watch the playoff between the Dodgers and Giants? Now, that's a rivalry. I know I was put off by this declaration; I can't imagine what kind of motivation it provided to players like Posey, Crawford, and Belt.

...and finally, the Dodgers. Thanks for "panicking" when the Giants kept winning and mortgaging a good chunk of your future by trading several top prospects for Max Scherzer and Trea Turner. And although both Scherzer and Turner played well during the regular season, neither had memorable playoffs. By contrast, the Giants didn't give up much to acquire Kris Bryant. And while it was a bitter pill to swallow when the Dodgers beat the Giants in the NLDS, by winning the West, the Giants did deny the Dodgers home field advantage in the playoffs, which probably cost them in their series against the Braves. So, to paraphrase Carl Spackler, we got that going for us, which is nice.

Sunday, June 13, 2021

Ideas Matter (Why Do So Many Christians Support Trump?, Part V)

In 2000, the sociologist Rodney Stark penned an essay criticizing social scientists of religion for attempting to reduce explanations of religious behavior to material causes (Religious Effects: In Praise of "Idealistic Humbug"):
Although social scientists involved in most other areas of study have long acknowledged the truism that, if people define somethingas real, it can have real consequences, this usually has been denied in the areaof religion. Instead, there has been a general willingness to agree with Karl Marx that any attempt to explain 'reality' by reference to an 'unreality' such as religion is "idealistic humbug..." (p. 289)
He goes on to point out several historical cases where religious ideas did matter. Take, for example, the abolitionist movement where religious leaders and groups such as Lyman Beecher (whose daughter wrote Uncle Tom's Cabin), Charles Grandison Finney (who turned Oberlin College into a center of the movement and a key underground railroad station), and the Quakers (who founded the Abolition Society in 1787).

Nevertheless, "social scientists have been able to see through these righteous 'poses' and to reveal that, far from reflecting moral commitment, abolitionism was but disguised "economic self interest" (p. 292). He notes that some scholars have argued, for instance, that the Quakers opposed slavery because they "were in the vanguard of the industrial revolution," and slavery "had become an impediment to the further development of capitalism" (p. 292).

Stark believes that such arguments are nonsensical. He's the first to admit that material conditions do impact human behavior, but he also believes that ideas have consequences. I agree.

Stark's point is helpful to keep in mind when trying to understand why so many theologically-conservative Christians voted for Donald Trump in 2016 and 2020. I've already explored a couple of "material" explanations, such as the "rural-urban" and the "economic" divides, but beliefs also play a role. One reason why so many white Christians support Trump is because he told them he would promote policies near and dear to their hearts, such as banning or limiting abortion, embracing religious freedom, and advocating Christian values in the public square. Many theologically-conservative Christians really do believe that life begins at conception, that their religious beliefs are being trampled on, and that America is in moral decline. And that all of this has contributed to America no longer being "great." R.R. Reno, editor of First Things, reflects this perspective nicely:
Legalizing marijuana and prostitution are part of the overarching policy of moral deregulation that our establishment has endorsed for the last two generations: no-fault divorce, the abortion license, lifting taboos against homosexuality, normalizing pornography, blurring distinctions between men and women, and more. The fact that our leaders should endorse moral deregulation in the face of 80,000 drug overdose deaths a year, declining marriage rates and rising illegitimacy rates, a broken male-female dance, increases in anomie, isolation, and suicide is astounding (First Things, June/July 2021, p. 70)
So, when Trump told evangelicals that they "would have power," he wasn't simply telling them that with him in the White House they would enjoy a level of political clout they hadn't in years, but he was also signaling that their values would no longer be ignored:
I will tell you, Christianity is under tremendous siege, whether we want to talk about it or we don’t want to talk about it... Christianity will have power. If I’m there, you’re going to have plenty of power, you don’t need anybody else. You’re going to have somebody representing you very, very well. Remember that.
To be clear: material factors have clearly played a role. But so have beliefs. So have ideas. Perhaps, one of the more intriguing arguments comes from the historian (and evangelical) Kristin Kobes Du Mez (Jesus and John Wayne), who argues that white evangelicals have long been primed to support someone like Trump who embodied a “rugged, aggressive, militant masculinity” and embraced “patriarchal authority, gender difference, and Christian nationalism” (pp. 6-7). Ronald Reagan fit this mold to an extent, but it is Donald Trump who has become their high priest. In spite of his personal moral failings, Trump is seen as the only one who can truly restore America to its former greatness. And that is reason enough to cast their votes for him.

Sunday, April 25, 2021

Most Members of the Military are not White Supremacists

That people are much more likely to join social movements or religious groups where they know someone (i.e., have a "tie") than those where they do not is about as close to a “law” as you will find within the social sciences. For example:
  • Back in the 1960s, when John Lofland and Rodney Stark (1965) observed individuals converting to the Unification Church (aka, the "Moonies"), they discovered that "the group had never succeeded in attracting a stranger" (Stark 1996:16)
  • In a 1980 analysis of individuals converting to the Mormon Church, Stark and William Bainbridge, 50% first came in contact with a missionary through a Mormon friend
  • In another 1980 study, David Snow and several colleagues examined several social movements (some religious, some secular) and found that for most, 70-90% of those who joined had a friendship or kinship tie with someone who was already a member
  • Doug McAdam's exploration of the 1964 Freedom Summer campaign to register Black Americans living in Mississippi to vote, found that having a prior tie to the Civil Rights movement was the strongest predictor of whether someone ultimately traveled to Mississippi to participate in the campaign
  • And Marc Sageman's 2004 analysis of what he called the "global Salafi jihad" (which would include those who participated in 9/11), found that of those who joined, 83% had a friendship, kinship, or mentor tie to the group
Be careful interpreting these results of studies, though. It's not unusual for people to draw the (incorrect) conclusion that most of the people who have a tie to a group will join. That's not what these studies show. They show that most of those who join a group have some sort of tie to the group, but that doesn't mean most people who have a tie to the group will join. Put differently, it's possible (maybe even likely) that of those who had a tie to one of these groups, only 1%-2% joined. Maybe even fewer.

Similarly, we need to be careful when interpreting data about the January 6th Capitol riot. Available data indicate that a disproportionate number of the rioters (about 1 in 5) were current or retired military, law enforcement, or government service employees. And Georgetown's Project on Extremism found that military individuals who participated in the riot were about four times more likely to be involved in domestic extremist organizations, such as the Proud Boys or Oath Keepers.

However, that doesn't mean that the military, law enforcement, and the government is littered with individuals associated extremist organizations or who embrace racist ideologies. Certainly not 1 in 5, probably not even 1 in 100, and maybe not even 1 in a 1,000. To be sure, a 2006 FBI report warned that white supremacist groups were trying to infiltrate law enforcement departments, and we need policies and procedures to minimize the hiring (and retaining) of folks officers Derek Chauvin. But don't assume that most law enforcement officials and members of the military are white supremacists.

Because they're not.

References:

John Lofland and Rodney Stark. 1965. "Becoming a World-Saver: A Theory of Conversion to a Deviant Perspective." American Sociological Review 30: 862-75.

Doug McAdam. 1986. "Recruitment to High Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer." American Journal of Sociology 92: 64-90.

Marc Sageman. 2004. Understanding Terror Networks. University of Pennsylvania Press.

David A. Snow, Louis A. Zurcher, and Sheldon Ekland-Olson. 1980. "Social Networks and Social Movements: A Microstructural Approach to Differential Recruitment." American Sociological Review 45: 787-801.

Rodney Stark William Sims Bainbridge. 1980. "Networks of Faith: Interpersonal Bonds and Recruitment to Cults and Sects." American Journal of Sociology 85(6): 1376-95.

Thursday, February 11, 2021

The Upswing: Robert Putnam and Shaylyn Garrett Offer Hope on Getting Back to "We"

Back in the summer, I reviewed Tara Burton's book, Strange Rites, in which she argues that people in general, and millennials in particular, are not so much abandoning religion as remixing it. They are trading in institutional religion for what Burton calls "intuitional" religion: namely, "narratives that simultaneously reject clear-cut creedal metaphysical doctrines and institutional hierarchies and place the locus of authority on people's experiential emotions" (p. 33). Moreover, she highlights how although the spiritual individualism of these intuitional faiths is often couched in the language of "self-care," it is often quite selfish.

We can place Burton's observations within a broader context outlined by Robert Putnam and Shaylyn Garrett in their recent book, The Upswing: How America Came Together a Century Ago and How We Can Do It Again. Briefly, Putnam and Garrett argue that over the last 125 years, the United States has moved from being an "I" to a "we" and back to an "I" society. They harness a wide variety of data which shows that the U.S. grew increasingly "egalitarian, cooperative, cohesive, and altruistic" (p. 11) from 1890 (the tail end of the Gilded Age) to the mid-1960s, but then it began to reverse itself and become increasing individualistic. "Between the mid-1960s and today... we have been experiencing declining economic equality, the deterioration of compromise in the public square, a fraying of social fabric, and a descent into cultural narcissism" (p. 11). The two figures below, from pages 10 (Figure 1:1) and 13 (Figure 1:2) of their book, capture their basic argument:


The one on the left plots aggregated measures of economic equality, political cooperation, social cohesion, and notions of individualism vs. community in American culture. The figure on the right combines these four measures into a single plot, which they refer to as the 'I-we-I' curve: "a gradual climb into greater interdependence and cooperation, followed by a steep descent into greater independence and egoism. It has been reflected in our experience of equality, our expression of democracy, our stock of social capital, our cultural identity, and our shared understanding of what this nation is about" (pp 12-13).

Putnam and Garrett explore religious adherence in their chapter on "isolation and solidarity" (Chapter 5). Using church membership data from the Historical Statistics of the United States and the Yearbook of American Churches, they show that church membership rates rose from less than 50% in 1890 to around 80% in the early 1960s after which it began to drop such that by 2017, it was back around 50%. Church membership data aren't exact (e.g., Roger Finke and Rodney Stark estimate that the church "adherence" rate peaked in 1980 and held steady until 2000), so they supplement it with church attendance and affiliation survey data. Much like Tara Burton, they conclude that the "religious 'we' [has] given way to the religious 'I'." (p. 138).

Perhaps more importantly, though, they locate this decline along side other measures of declining solidarity. They show that it isn't just churches that are experiencing membership declines, but so are civic associations and unions. Philanthropy has also declined steadily since the mid-1960s, although giving by the mega-rich has increased (a situation not unlike the Gilded Age), but not nearly at a rate high enough to offset the general decline. Drawing on several measures, they also show that the family as an institution also began to decline in 1960s. In other words, it isn't just that the "religious 'we' [has] given way to the religious 'I'." It is also true that the institutional "we" that has given way to the intuitional "I."

Putnam and Garrett are careful to distinguish the virtues of solidarity and community from the stifling conformity that so many rebelled against in the 1960s:
[The] reformers of the 1960s had good reasons for seeking to expand individual rights. Indeed, so much was achieved and set in motion in the realm of personal rights in the 1960s that it might be hard not to look at that decade as a time when the yoke of repression and conformity was finally broken, individuals were freed to be who they wanted to be, and American was held account for its failings in guaranteeing liberty and equality under the law. However... the net effect of these progressive and forward-thinking movements was... to emphasize individualism and individual rights at the expense of widely shared communitarian values. The movements of the 1960s to "liberate" individuals in many cases had the unintended side effect of elevating selfishness... 
The solution to hyper-individualism is never hyper-communitarianism, nor a repudiation of equally important American values such as liberty and self-determination. For solutions to be long-lasting and to hold widespread appeal, they must respect the full range of American ideals. (p. 313, 337)
Putnam and Garrett are not the first to document (and lament) America's increasing individualism. Putnam, himself, took up the subject in his "Bowling Alone" article (1995) and book (2001), and Robert Bellah and his colleagues explored it in "Habits of the Heart" (1985) and "The Good Society" (1992).

Here, however, Putnam and Garrett offer a sliver of hope that we can reverse our hyper-individualism, just as we did back in the 1890s. In fact, they hold up the Progressive Era, which roughly dates from 1890 to 1915, as something from which we can learn and adapt. Although it was flawed (e.g., racism was the norm among progressives back then), we can still look back to "better understand [how] the mind-set, tools, and tactics employed by early-century reformers may inform and empower us to overcome the drift of our own time, achieve our own form of mastery, and ultimately reverse our course to create a new chapter in the American story" (p. 339).