Just War and the Fight Against Terrorism

The just-war tradition is guided by the goal of a just peace, which is the belief that at war's end the offending country’s social, political, economic and ecological conditions will be such that its citizens, both individually and in their common life together, are able to flourish (eudaimonia), to live lives that are meaningful and dignified (Allman and Winwright, After the Smoke Clears). The three sets of criteria of the just war tradition reflect this goal of a just peace. The first set (jus ad bellum -- justice at the time of war) places considerable restrictions on the moral ability of authorities to wage war because the tradition recognizes that the horrors that war can unleash are often difficult for a country and its people to recover from. The second set (jus in bello -- justice during war) place restraints on how wars are fought in order to minimize the damage that is done. For instance, the criterion of proportionality seeks to insure that no unnecessary destruction takes place, while the criterion of non-combatant immunity (i.e., civilians can't be deliberatively targeted or killed) recognizes that a country’s citizens need to be spared as much as possible from the ravages of war if they are to flourish after the fighting has stopped. Finally, the third set of criteria (jus post bellum -- justice after war) explicitly concerns itself with the restoration of the country to wholeness such that its citizens are able to live lives are worth living.

Because the just war tradition developed with conventional warfare in mind, it is legitimate to ask how (and if) it should be applied to the fight against terrorism, a fight that is often fought using unconventional or irregular means. I believe that the answer is that it should because the goal of a just peace is one worth fighting for but only if it is fought for justly. In particular, the principle of non-combatant immunity should loom large in how the problem of terrorism is tackled. How we can apply this principle to the fight against terrorism can be illustrated when considering the practice of targeted killing, a practice that the Israelis made famous (Walzer, Thinking Politically, p. 274). An obvious objection to the practice is that it is no different from assassination and thus prohibited by the just war tradition. That, however, is not true. The just war tradition only prohibits the killing of political leaders on the assumption that at war's end, a peace agreement will need to be hammered out with such leaders. It does not rule out the killing military personnel or enemy combatants, which the terrorists clearly are (Walzer, Thinking Politically, pp. 274-275). Thus, on the face of it, it appears that the practice is permitted by the tradition since, by definition, the practice of targeted killing seeks to avoid the killing of non-combatants.

That said, it cannot be stressed enough that the authorities need to take extra care in making their targeting decisions (Walzer, Thinking Politically, p. 275). This, however, can be quite difficult since terrorists often seek to blend in with the crowd, making detection more difficult and the loss of innocent life more likely, which is why we have to be as sure as we can that we can hit targeted persons without killing innocent people who are nearby:

Here I think we have to adopt standards that are closer to Philadelphia than Afghanistan. In a war zone, collateral damage cannot be avoided; it can only be minimized. The hard question in war is what degree of risk we are willing to accept for our own soldiers in order to reduce the risks we impose on enemy civilians. Bur when the police are chasing criminals in a zone of peace, we rightly give them no latitude for collateral damage. In the strongest sense, they must intend not to injure civilians--even if that makes their operation more difficult... That seems to me roughly the the right rule for people planning targeted killings... They can't avoid imposing some degree of risk on innocent people, and the risks will certainly be greater than those imposed by police in a city at peace, but we must insist on a strenuous effort to minimize the risks” (Walzer, Thinking Politically, p. 276).

 Targeted killing is not the only option, however, and it may not be the most desirable one. Research has shown that terrorist networks are remarkably resilient and often are able to recover quite quickly after a key leader has been eliminated. Moreover, terrorist groups generally suffer more "damage" if one of their members is captured or (better yet) defects. Defection, in particular, can shut a terrorist group's operations down for weeks or months because the group doesn’t know what information has been passed to the authorities (Eli Berman, Radical, Religious and Violent). Of course, getting someone to defect is easier said than done, but reconciliation and amnesty programs in Indonesia and Singapore have met with some success. Other evidence suggests that policies aimed at eliminating the structural conditions that help give rise to terrorist groups in the first place (e.g., building alternative schools, improving economic conditions, eliminating ungoverned spaces) can all be effective in reducing the prevalence of terrorism as well.

Most likely no single strategy, by itself, will do the trick. Instead, we will need a combination of them. Moreover, these alternative (and non-lethal) strategies, however, require an acknowledgement on our part that the fight against terrorism is ultimately a long one, which given our tendency to be an impatient people, makes adhering to the principles of the just war tradition all that more difficult. Nevertheless, if a just peace is our goal, if we want to help create a world where individuals are free to flourish, then I don't see where we have much of a choice.

Crowd Sizes, Glenn Beck and Championship Rallies

It appears that the Giants attracted about as many people to its championship rally in San Francisco as Glenn Beck did for his in Washington DC.  One interpretation of this is that sports fans take their sports much too seriously (the word, "fan," after all is a shortened version of "fanatic"). Another is that most people aren't taking Glenn Beck as seriously as some in the press are inclined to believe. I prefer the latter interpretation.

Midterm Election Results

It appears that most of my elections predictions came true. Republicans gained control of the House but failed to gain control of the Senate.  Barbara Boxer won in her attempt to retain her Senate seat, and Lisa Murkowski is making a decent run at retaining hers even though she lost the primary to Tea Party candidate (and Sara Palin favorite) Joe Miller. I was wrong about Harry Reid, though. I thought he would lose, but he proved me wrong.

So, what does this mean for President Obama's chances in two years? Well, it certainly isn't a death sentence considering that at the two year mark in Bill Clinton's Presidency, Democrats lost control of both the House and Senate.  It doesn't mean he's a lock for reelection either.  It will largely hinge on how quickly the economy recovers and how much it expands between now and Election Day 2012.  Some Wall Street insiders seems to think that the economy will benefit from the strong showing of Republicans in this election. If they are right, then one of the ironies of this election is that in the long run it may benefit President Obama more than it benefits the 2012 GOP nominee for President.

We will see, what we will see...

The Whole is Greater Than the Sum of its Parts: Or, Why the Giants Finally Won the World Series

Within complexity theory the term "emergence" refers to the way complex systems and patterns arise out of a series of relatively simple interactions. Complexity scholars generally refer to two types of emergence: weak and strong. Weak emergence describes how new properties arise in systems from interactions at an elemental level such that the resulting system has qualities that can be traced back to its constituent parts. Strong emergence, on the other hand, refers to those systems that have qualities that can't be directly traced back to its parts but rather to how those parts interact. Thus, the system's qualities are seen as "irreducible" to its constituent parts.  Put another way: the whole is sometimes greater than the sum of its parts ("Emergence," Wikipedia).

Much has been made that this year's San Francisco Giants team was able to knock off the Braves (not too surprising but probably the toughest series the Giants played), the Phillies (a surprise to just about everyone except SF fans -- we knew we had better pitching) and the Rangers (22 out of 28 ESPN "experts" picked the Rangers to beat the Giants) with very few stars apart from its pitching staff, especially compared to SF Giants World Series teams of the past. For example, the 1962 Giants team included future Hall of Famers Willie Mays, Orlando Cepeda and Willie McCovey, while the 2002 team had (probable) future Hall of Famers Jeff Kent and Barry Bonds. The 1989 team wasn't anything to sneeze at either; it included Will "The Thrill" Clark (lifetime .303 hitter), Robby Thompson, Matt Williams and Kevin Mitchell (the 1989 National League MVP).

What is the difference between this year's team and those previous teams? Former Giant player and manager Felipe Alou probably captured it best:

Sometimes in the past, we had great teams. We had many great Giants. But "the team" was not as great as this team, if you know what I mean. A team is not necessarily a bunch of great players together. But this team -- this is a team (Cam Inman, "Past Giants Greats Never Equaled This Team").

Put simply, the Giants, as a whole, were greater than the sum of their parts.  Apart from the pitching staff, which was probably the best in the majors this year (if there were any doubters prior to the playoffs, there probably aren't any now), this team didn't have any stars (although Buster Posey comes pretty close).  Different players contributed at different times. When players who were hot during the regular season cooled off during the playoffs, others picked up the pace.  When a clutch hit was needed, someone almost always came through, and it seemed like it was a different person every time (e.g., Cody Ross, Edgar Renteria, Aubrey Huff, Andres Torres, Juan Uribe, Buster Posey, Freddy Sanchez all had key hits in the World Series).

So, yes, sometimes the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. That was certainly the case with the San Francisco Giants this year. To borrow a little from complexity theory, what we have here is an example of strong emergence. Very strong emergence indeed. May it always be so.

Christians and War, Part III: Justice After War

The just-war tradition is decidedly teleological. It is driven by the goal of a just peace, which is nothing less than at war's end the social, political, economic and ecological conditions are such that citizens of the offending country are able to flourish.  It is this vision of what the purposes of a just war are that has led some theorists to argue that in addition to the criteria of jus ad bellum (justice before war) and jus in bello (justice during war), there should be a set of jus post bellum (justice after war) criteria as well.  That is, not only must there be guidelines for going to war and for fighting wars, but there should be guidelines on what to do after a war is over.  While these criteria are anything but settled, a new book by Mark Allman and Tobias Winright lists four that are worth our consideration and debate: (1) resolution (which they refer to as "just cause"), (2) reconciliation, (3) punishment and (4) restoration. 

By resolution or just cause they mean that the result of any just war should entail reaching the objectives that served as the (just) cause for going to war in the first place.  Thus, the primary parties involved must be held accountable until their mission is accomplished (i.e., blasting away and then letting the offending country pick up the pieces afterward is unacceptable), and those parties involved in the war must be prevented from taking advantage of the vanquished country's weakness and seeking additional (and unwarranted) gains.

Allman and Winright also believe that there cannot be a just peace without reconciliation. However, they are emphatic there call for reconciliation "is not about cheap grace or taking a 'forgive and forget' approach. [Rather] it involves acknowledgment of wrongdoing, admission of responsibility, punishment, forgiveness and perhaps amnesty.  Ideally, reconciliation should lead to the return of the offending party to communion. The goal is justice tempered by mercy" ("When the Shooting Stops").

That said, they also believe that the guilty should be punished for their crimes. Such punishment, they argue, should should be carried out with transparency, proportionality and by authorities other than those who led the war, so that the war's victors are not seen as acting as judge, jury and executioner. This way those meting the punishment are seen as legitimate and the punishment itself as just.


Finally, Allman and Winright argue that the goal of a just war should also involve the restoration of the offending country to wholeness so that citizens of that country can live lives that are meaningful and dignified. Thus restoration involves practical matters such as providing security through policing and the rule of law, enabling the host government to promote the common good and provide basic services, fostering economic recovery, providing rehabilitation for those victimized by the war (and events that led up to it) and removing unexploded devices and munitions to prevent injuries in the future.

As noted above theorists are just in the beginning stages of hammering out what jus post bellum criteria might look like. Nevertheless, they are certainly food for thought as the U.S. seeks to extricate itself from Iraq and Afghanistan. We surely do not want to leave until we can assure the Iraqis and Afghanis a "just peace."

Midterm Elections Redux

In an earlier post on the midterm elections, I predicted that the Republicans would gain control of the House but not the Senate (although they would make it very close). My sense is that with a week to go before the election, nothing has occurred to alter this predictions. The Republicans will gain control of the House; the only question now is, "By how much?" The last data I saw, suggested that when the dust settled the Republicans would hold somewhere around 235-240 of the 435 seats (currently, the Democrats hold 255). 

As far as control of the Senate goes, Republican control hinges largely on whether in California the Republican challenger, Carly Fiorina, can upset the incumbent Democrat Barbara Boxer, which at the moment seems unlikely. Regardless of the outcome, it looks like the Senate will have a new Majority Leader because the current one, Harry Reid (from Nevada), will probably lose his reelection bid. Who will take his place is hard to say -- Diane Feinstein, perhaps -- probably not, but it will be interesting to see what happens. 

Just as interesting is whether Charlie Crist will catch Marco Rubio in the race for the Florida Senate seat (probably not) and whether Republican Lisa Murkowski (running as an independent) will beat the official Republican (and Tea Party) candidate Joe Miller (possibly).

As one of my friends likes to say, we will see what we will see...

Christians and War, Part II: The Just War Tradition

In its early years the Christian Church was predominantly pacifist, but as it was transformed from a minority religion to the official religion of the land, it became impractical for it to remain pacifist. The just war criteria arose, in part, because of this transformation, but the just war tradition not only sets itself over against pacifism but also over against more brutal forms of war.  As Michael Walzer points out in his book, Arguing About War (“The Triumph of Just War Theory (and the Dangers of Success)"), that from the start, “the theory had a critical edge: soldiers (or, at least, their officers) were supposed to refuse to fight in wars of conquest and to oppose or abstain from the standard military practices of rape and pillage after the battle was won.” Not much has changed over the centuries. Today, just war theorists still find themselves standing between two sets of theorists: pacifists, for whom war is a crime, and realists, “for whom ‘all’s fair in love and war’: inter arma silent leges (in time of war, the laws are silent)” (Walzer, "Introduction,” Arguing About War).

The just war criteria can be grouped into two sets of criteria: Those that govern the decision to go to war (jus ad bellum) and those that govern the conduct of war (jus in bello). More recently, some, such as Michael Walzer ("Introduction,” Arguing About War) and Mark J. Allman and Tobias L. Winright (“When the Shooting Stops”) have argued for a third set of criteria, jus post bellum (justice after the war), that address the theory and practice of peacemaking, military occupation and political reconstruction. I only discuss the first two below since there is little consensus over whether the third set of criteria should be included, and, if so, what they should be. I will probably return to this third set of criteria in a later post, however.

Jus ad bellum

1.      Legitimate Authority – This criterion asserts that only legitimate authorities may wage war.  The Christian just war tradition has tended to understand legitimate authority rather broadly.  It argues that authority over matters of life and death belongs to God, and God has shared this authority with the governing powers, which is why governing authorities may wage war. Examples of legitimate authorities include individuals who rule through “dynastic dissent” (e.g., kings, queens, etc.) and democratically elected officials.  An exception to this general rule is that officials who have gained their authority through legitimate means but are “bad” rulers (e.g., tyrants), forfeit their claim to legitimacy. Examples of illegitimate authorities include wars waged by private citizens (e.g., militia groups), bandits and privateers and rebellion against one’s own sovereign. An exception to this rule is that rebellion is permitted when the sovereign has lost claim to his or her legitimacy because they are tyrants or they lie. Furthermore, only soldiers under oath and under control of a sovereign can fight.  Similarly, mercenaries are not allowed to participate in war unless it is for a cause they know is just.  Clergy, the religious, and penitents are excluded from fighting, except individuals who are members of military religious orders (it used to be that a man who killed another, even in a just war, was not allowed to become a priest).

2.      Just Cause – This criterion holds that a war may be fought for only a just cause, that is a justifiable, defensible and morally necessary cause (given the alternatives).  To be just the offense must be actual and verifiable, intentional and of substantial importance (i.e., it cannot be a trivial cause).  Furthermore, an offense cannot be provoked; that is, a queen or president can’t goad someone into committing an offense so that they can then declare war.  The offense may be an aggression necessitating defense, a threat demanding deterrence (e.g., WMD’s), or an injustice demanding reparation (e.g., the Holocaust). It can be committed against a third nation, against either an ally or innocent subjects on whose behalf a legitimate authority intervenes. Just war theorists often disagree about when intervention on behalf of an oppressed population is legitimate. Walzer believes that the presumption must be against intervention, but he admits that there are times when the evil being committed is so great (e.g., the Holocaust) that intervention is necessary.

3.      Right Intention, Right Motivation – This criterion states that in order for a war to be just it must be fought with a right intention. The ultimate goal must be the restoration of a just peace.  Wars can’t be fought for national honor or territorial, economic aggrandizement and so on. It also must be fought with the right motivation. There needs to be genuine concern for the victims of the offense as well as love for the enemy, which is why demonstrating mercy after victory is sometimes listed by some as a criterion. Examples of inadmissible motivation include hatred, revenge, cruelty, love of violence or material gain. In other words, a cause may be justified, but participation in it may still be sinful if the intention or motivation is wrong in any one of these ways.

4.      Last Resort – The just-war tradition contends that war must be the last resort, only after everything else has been tried or considered.  Of course, how one defines “everything else” is somewhat problematic and subject to much debate since there is almost always something else that can be tried.  Generally, what theorists have in mind is that the government needs to make a good faith effort to avoid war through negotiation, mediation, arbitration, appeals to international tribunals, cooling off period(s), and formal declaration of war, preceded by a warning and followed by time for the “offending party” to sue for peace. If all of these are sincerely tried (and fail), then most just war theorists would say that a good faith effort has been made.

5.      Probability of Success – Finally, in order for a war to be just, success must be probable. If the wrong can’t be righted by going to war, there is no point in going to war.  Of course, it is not always that straightforward when it comes to estimating the probability of succeeding. Sometimes, wars that look easy to win turn out to be much more difficult than anticipated.

Jus in bello

1.      Proportionality – Once war begins the punishment must be proportionate to the offense (an eye for an eye…). Thus, the means used must be indispensable and necessary. Any intended destruction inflicted on the enemy must serve the stated ends of the just cause. We cannot destroy an enemy battalion simply because we can or because we seek a postwar advantage in further weakening the enemy. In short, unnecessary combat must be avoided even in a just cause.  Put simply, there should be no unnecessary death or wanton destruction. We can’t poison wells or rivers, plant land mines, and/or bomb or profane places of worship or sanctuary.  Furthermore, the enemy must always be allowed to sue for peace. We can’t kill an enemy who has surrendered. Other considerations often included under this criterion are that cease-fire agreements must be respected, occupied populations should be governed justly, and we can’t improperly use truce flags, enemy uniforms, or distinctive badges of groups such as the Red Cross, in order to lull the enemy into an ambush.

2.      Non-Combatant Immunity/Dignity of Life – This criterion argues that the means used in war must protect the innocent (non-combatants). Armies must not intentionally or directly kill non-combatants.  During a just war, they have an obligation to distinguish combatants from non-combatants and seek to minimize noncombatant death. This criterion, of course, essentially rules out obliteration bombing or the dropping of atomic bombs.  Noncombatants include all who are not considered a threat: (1) women (traditionally), children (traditionally), the elderly and the infirm, (2) clergy, the religious and foreigners, (3) unarmed individuals pursuing ordinary vocations, and (4) soldiers who are on leave or have become prisoners of war.  Noncombatants include all of the above not just those who oppose their country’s participation in the war (e.g., German women and children who supported Germany during WW II would still be considered non-combatants who should be protected from the waging of war).

It is important to note that in order for a war to be just, all of the criteria must be met, a point that is often lost in debates over whether a particular war is just or unjust. Students of mine at Santa Clara often fell into this trap. Anxious to prove that a particular war was unjust, they would attempt to argue that it was unjust on all counts (i.e.., in terms of all seven of the criteria). This led them to sometimes make poor arguments concerning one criterion that took away from the force of their arguments concerning the other criteria.

The fight against terrorism raises its own issues, in particular to the notion of noncombatant immunity since terrorists tend not to make such a distinction and often hide in places that makes targeting them without incurring collateral damage impossible. I will need to take this issue up in a later post since it deserves an extended discussion.

Three books worth considering if you are interested in exploring this topic further are (1) John Howard Yoder’s, When War is Unjust (Yoder was a pacifist but held the just-war tradition in high regard and taught a class on it for ROTC students when he was at Notre Dame), (2) Darrel Cole’s, When God Says War is Right (a somewhat more conservative take on the just war tradition), Michael Walzer’s, Just and Just Wars (considered a classic by many).